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Abstract
The paper estimates the money demand in Croatia using monthly data
from 1994 to 2002. A failure of the Fisher equation is found and adjustment
to the standard money demand function is made to include the ination
rate as well as the nominal interest rate. In a two-equation cointegrated
system, a stable money demand shows rapid convergence back to equilib-
rium after shocks. This function performs better than an alternative using
the exchange rate instead of the ination rate, as in the "pass-through"
literature on exchange rates. The results provide a basis for ination rate
forecasting and suggest the ability to use ination targeting goals in tran-
sition countries during the EU accession process. Finding a stable money
demand also limits the scope for central bank "ination bias".
We are grateful to the Open Society Institute for grant support, and thank Szilard Benk,
Tony Nakov, and the journal referees for suggestions.
1. Introduction
Neoclassical money demand functions underlie much theoretical and empirical
work. Typically the nominal interest rate is the price of money and the income
velocity of money moves in conjunction with this rate. This is as in Friedmans
(1956) restatement of money demand theory, although it contrasts with the insti-
tutionally xed velocity in Fishers (1911) quantity theory. Similarly to Fisher,
velocity has often been assumed to be exogenous (Lucas, 1980, Ireland, 1996,
Alvarez et al., 2001). Similarly to Friedman, others have endeavored to explain
velocity and related phenomena within the model (Hodrick et al., 1991; Eckstein
and Leiderman, 1992; Ireland, 1995; Lucas, 2000; Gillman and Kejak, 2004, 2005).
Empirical work on money demand has focused on interest rate explanations
as in the constant semi-interest elasticity model of Cagan (1956) (Eckstein and
Leiderman, 1992, Mark and Sul, 2003) or the constant interest elasticity model
of Baumol (1952) (Ho¤man and Rasche, 1991; Ho¤man et al, 1995; Lucas, 2000).
Apparent instability in empirical money demand functions was found due to
"shifts" in demand in the 1980s; for example Friedman and Kuttner (1992) found
a break in cointegration around 1980. This instability literature was met with an
e¤ort to include, within the money demand function, the prices of substitutes for
money that may have been subject to large changes and that may have caused
money demand without these substitute prices to appear unstable. In particular,
interest earning accounts with demand deposits that could be used in exchange,
or "exchange credit", were used to avoid the high ination tax of the 1980s and
seemed to cause a shift in money demand. Including proxies for nancial service
innovation led to renewed results of stable money demand functions, even includ-
ing the period of the big nancial deregulations (Friedman and Schwartz, 1982,
Gillman et al., 1997; Gillman and Otto, 2003).
Money demand has become less visible in the policy debate because of interest
in Taylor (1999)-type rules. The focus on nominal interest rate instruments has
bred the perception of policy irrelevance of money demand theory and the use of
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monetary aggregates. However, McCallum (1999) has disputed such conclusions
by emphasizing that money demand and the use of rules based partly on money
aggregates are being disregarded to the detriment of the ultimate monetary policy
results. Alvarez et al. (2001) further advance the importance of money aggregates
by providing a general equilibrium basis for the equivalence between interest rate
rules and money supply rules. Similarly, Schabert (2004) establishes a liquidity
e¤ect in a general equilibrium neoclassical monetary model, in which there is also
a direct relation between the money supply growth rate and the nominal interest
rate. And empirical money demand work has recently become more prominent
in the central banks of developed nations (for example, the euro-area studies of
Brand and Cassola, 2004; Brand et al., 2002; Kontolemis, 2002).
Developing nations tend to rely more on discretion rather than rules and often
justify this just as central banks in developed nations did in the past: the money
demand function is unstable. This sort of discretion instead of rules can lead
to an "ination bias" of the type described by Kydland and Prescott (1977).
Empirically, evaluating the stability of money demand still remains a challenge
in developing countries, because of a lack of condence in the data quality and
because of the many major changes that continue to occur in such economies.
In this paper, the key extension to a standard money demand function results
from an investigation of whether the Fisher equation of interest rates holds.1 The
myriad ways in which an unexpected acceleration or deceleration of the ination
rate can a¤ect the real interest rate makes suspect the standard Fisher (1930)
relation that underlies classical money demand functions. In those, changes in
the ination rate are directly reected in the nominal interest rate. But if this is
not true, which can be a likely scenario in a transition country, then the standard
money demand function requires modication from only including the nominal
interest rate as the price of money.
1For example see Crowders (2003) panel testing of this equation; see also Brand and Cas-
sola (2000) for an alternative multi-equation money demand approach that includes a Fisher
equation.
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With an extended money demand specication, the paper shows that a stable
money demand function can be found for Croatia despite tumultuous changes
there over the transition period. This presents a good case study in that the
nding of a stable money demand may be surprising. Both the emphasis of the
Croatian central bank on the exchange rate in its monetary policy and the high
fraction of private foreign exchange use in the country have led to the expectation
that Croatian money demand is unstable (see Kraft, 2003). However, with a
money demand that accounts for failure of the Fisher relation, a stable function is
estimated with VECM techniques using monthly International Financial Statistics
(IFS) data from 1994 to 2002. Over this period the data is reliable, and several
robustness checks are conducted, including a focus on exchange rates within the
money demand function.
The data begins only after the Croatian hyperination of 1993, and near to
the beginning of the issuing of the new Croatian currency, providing condence
in the data. The datas stationarity and seasonal properties are tested carefully
(Section 3). After nding the Croatian income velocity of money non-stationary
(Section 4.1), in contrast to Fishers (1911) concept, the paper focuses on whether
the Fisher (1930) equation of interest rates holds in Croatia. Researchers such as
Baba et al. (1992) have included the ination rate as well as the nominal interest
rate in the money demand function; this strategy is justied here in that evidence
suggests a failure of the long-run Fisher relation in which the nominal interest rate
and ination rate move together and are interchangeable in the money demand
function (Section 4.2). This extension of money demand to include the ination
rate along with the nominal interest rate, and so capture deviations from the
Fisher equation, constitutes the baseline model (Section 4.3).
Petrovic andMladenovic (2000) estimate Yugoslavian money demand using the
exchange rate rather than the ination rate or the nominal interest rate. The idea
is that exchange rates reect the ination rate changes, as in the uncovered interest
rate parity concept (see for example Walsh, 2003). This approach to money
demand is sometimes used to support a monetary policy of exchange rate targeting
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even when the goal is to decrease the ination rate. As part of the robustness
investigation, the paper compares this alternative money demand approach to the
baseline model (Section 4.3.2).
While data limitations in terms of the length of the time series are an important
qualication, implications can still be cautiously deduced. A stable money demand
is useful because it suggests the variables that can be used to forecast ination.
And all central banks appear to engage in ination rate forecasting as one of
their crucial tasks. Croatia in 2001, along with Hungary in 2001 and Poland in
1997, established new central bank chartering acts that state price stability as the
primary goal of the central bank. Croatia has recently had very low ination, and
low ination in Croatia remains the goal, even if it may be using the exchange
rate as its primary instrument.
The results show that the ination rate enters a stable money demand function
that exhibits fast readjustment to shocks. This suggests that an ination targeting
policy (Svensson, 1999) will not "de-stabilize" money demand. In contrast to the
baseline model, including the exchange rate instead of the ination rate yields
a near-zero adjustment to shocks. This implies that an exchange rate targeting
strategy may induce a perceived instability in the money demand function if, for
example, such a policy results in substantial ination rate volatility that keeps
the money demand constantly readjusting (Section 5).
2. Croatian Money, Policy, and Banking Background
We rst consider some descriptive facts about Croatian real money use, nominal
interest rates and the ination rate over the 1994-2002 period; these help indicate
whether it is likely that a classic money demand function will be operative. The
money aggregate M1 comprises the new Croatian Kuna currency, as of May 30,
1994, and Kuna-denominated demand deposits.2 Figure 1 shows that the quantity
of real money [M/P], dened here in terms of M1, and the nominal interest rate
2The Kuna replaced the Croatian Dinar that had been introduced on December 23, 1991,
when Croatia became an independent state.
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(Money Market rate [MM]) move inversely as in a classical money demand func-
tion. However, the gure also shows that the ination rate and nominal interest
rate do not move together as in a Fisher equation.
Figure 1. Real Money, Ination, and the Nominal Interest Rate
Between 1994 and 2001 the ination rate was fairly stable around 5%; it then
moved downwards steadily towards very low levels by 2003; and it has remained
in the 1.5% range. With such low rates, the Croatian National Bank has begun
succeeding in its "primary objective to achieve and maintain price stability" (2001
National Bank Act). This low ination has been achieved while the Bank has
been described as being engaged in strict exchange rate targeting (Billmeier
and Bonato, 2004). Or as Kraft (2003) puts it: "The main intermediate target
is the exchange rate, not any monetary aggregate. In that respect, Croatias
monetary policy resembles an exchange rate x more than a oat of any sort" (p.
14). These di¤erent perspectives suggest that the exchange rate may have been
an important instrument in the Banks realization of its low ination goal.
An interesting banking aspect of the M1 aggregate can be seen in Figure 2.
Currency constitutes the lions share of M1; the demand deposit to currency ratio
averages well below one. In comparison, for example, the US demand deposit to
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currency ratio has trended downwards steadily from 4 in 1959 to near 1 in 2002.
Low- or non-interest bearing demand deposits have been used signicantly less in
Croatia than in the US.
Figure 2. Croatian Monetary Aggregates
Another banking feature is that there have been signicant foreign currency
denominated deposits, now primarily in Euros. These deposits have accounted
for some 75% of total new deposits (Kraft, 2003). Kraft suggests that these
holdings may imply a "lack of credible monetary policy", adding that Croatians
have a "habit of saving in foreign exchange" (p.4). Such a habit can be due
to ination avoidance and, in addition, may reect a lesser use of banking for
exchange purposes.
The commercial bank sector has seen signicant turmoil. The banks started
out as state owned, and have gradually become privatized in the face of many
disruptions to activity. Stringent restrictions have been imposed on the banks at
times, for example with reserve requirements as high as 31% during the war period
of 1995, and with punitive levels of reserves if bank credit exceeded a certain
threshold in recent years. Deregulation and liberalization started in earnest in
1996, when the government received an investment grade rating on its debt and
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a large commercial bank consolidation took place. A crisis occurred in 1998-1999
with some bank insolvencies, and bank reform acts were passed in 1999 and 2002.
Restructuring and privatization was largely nished by 2001.3
A weak, gradually reforming commercial bank sector could help explain the
greater use of currency and foreign exchange denominated deposits. But a lesser
use of banking does not necessarily threaten the stability of money demand. The
main factors that have caused large shifts in money demand in developed coun-
tries have been the big, sudden nancial deregulations of the 1980s (Gillman and
Kejak, 2004; Benk et al., 2004). Such changes in nancial sector productivity
can be incorporated in money demand functions in order to stabilize an otherwise
seemingly unstable money demand function, as Gillman and Otto (2003) show
in time series estimations for the US and Australia. However, deregulation has
been gradual in Croatia and inclusion of nancial sector variables in the money
demand function appears less necessary.
3. Data and descriptive analysis
The data used in the estimation are IFS time series with monthly frequency and
seasonal adjustment: industrial production for the output variable, M1 money,
consumer prices, a Croatian Kuna (HRK)-euro exchange rate, and the money
market interest rate (Table 3.2). The variables are in natural logarithms of the
indices with base year 1995. The data span is from April 1994 till August 2002
for all series, which are plotted in Figure 3 along with velocity (output divided by
3For example, three banks, Bjelovarska Banka, Trgovacka Banka and Cakovecka Banka were
merged into Erste and Sleiermarkische Bank in September 2000 to make one of the 10 largest
banks in Croatia. Erste then bought 85% of Rijecka Banka in April 2002 and merged it with
Erste and Sleiermarkische Bank in August 2003 to make the third largest bank group in Croatia.
Another example is Slavoska Banka, which started in 1955 and sold some 35% of its shares in
1999 to the EBRD and Hypo Alpe Adria Bank. Zagrebacka Banka was the rst Croatian bank
to be registered as a joint stock company, with limited liability, in 1989, the rst bank rated by
the three major international ratings companies in 1997, and a bank that recently accounted
for 25% of total Croatian banking assets. It partnered internationally in 2002, with UniCredito
Italiano and Allianz.
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real money).
Figure 3. Money demand variables
3.1. Seasonal unit root tests
To ensure that the use of seasonally adjusted data is appropriate, we rst consider
Figure 4, which compares seasonally unadjusted series with seasonally adjusted
series. Only modest di¤erences emerge. However, it is useful to test whether
explicit modeling of seasonality is requisite. In particular, if the series are sto-
chastic and there exist seasonal unit roots, then these unit roots would need to be
adjusted for through seasonal di¤erencing (Davidson et al., 1978; Dickey et al.,
1984; Beaulieu and Miron, 1993; Canova and Hansen, 1995).
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Figure 4. The E¤ect of Seasonal Adjustment
The particular test used for seasonal unit roots is that of Hylleberg et al. (1990) as
adapted to monthly data by Franses (1990), based on the following OLS regression:
12yt = 1y1;t 1 + 2y2;t 1 + 3y3;t 1 + 4y3;t 2 + 5y4;t 1
+ 6y4;t 2 + 7y5;t 1 + 8y5;t 2 + 9y6;t 1 + 10y6;t 2
+ 11y7;t 1 + 12y7;t 2 +
12X
i=1
iDit + t+ ut;
where,
9
y1;t = (1 + L)(1 + L
2)(1 + L4 + L8)yt;
y2;t =  (1  L)(1 + L2)(1 + L4 + L8)yt;
y3;t =  (1  L2)(1 + L4 + L8)yt;
y4;t =  (1  L4)(1 
p
3L+ L2)(1 + L2 + L4)yt;
y5;t =  (1  L4)(1 +
p
3L+ L2)(1 + L2 + L4)yt;
y6;t =  (1  L4)(1  L2 + L4)(1  L+ L2)yt;
y7;t =  (1  L4)(1  L2 + L4)(1 + L+ L2)yt:
The t-tests for the signicance of the coe¢ cients are given in Table 3.1, which
can be compared to the critical values tabulated by Franses (1990). The 1 coef-
cients are below their 95% critical values indicating that a unit root hypothesis
cannot be rejected at the zero frequency, using the standard Dickey-Fuller tests.
Yet the existence of seasonal unit roots is rejected for all i coe¢ cients. Note that
seasonal dummies and a time trend are included in the test regressions. These
results together indicate that there is a stochastic trend within the series and that
seasonality is deterministic. This means that seasonality need not be modeled
explicitly. Using seasonally adjusted data directly, without having to remove any
seasonal unit roots, allows us to save degrees of freedom with a limited data set.
3.2. Unit root tests of seasonally adjusted series
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit-root tests for the order of integration (Table
3.3) do not reject the hypothesis that the tested series have a unit root and are
thus I(1). The ADF tests were performed by considering all options regarding
deterministic components (i.e., trend and constant) and in all cases the unit-root
hypothesis could not be rejected. Additional ADF tests on rst di¤erences nd
strong rejection of the unit-root null in all series.
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Table 3.1: Seasonal unit root tests (t-values)
Coe¢ cient mt pt it ext rt
1 2.997 1.647 1.798 1.685 1.891
2 4.963 4.069 1.536 4.959 3.392
3 2.649 2.584 3.845 2.653 2.097
4 5.337 4.693 3.967 3.419 3.392
5 11.503 8.545 6.766 10.734 8.241
6 5.393 4.171 3.356 3.230 4.063
7 3.640 3.709 5.500 5.289 3.634
8 12.289 9.077 6.733 11.215 8.508
9 8.902 6.795 5.670 8.720 6.821
10 4.684 3.728 2.932 4.827 3.607
11 4.500 4.257 5.303 5.577 4.343
12 12.729 8.328 4.694 11.143 7.838
The ination rate series deserves careful consideration, in that evidence on the
integration order of the ination rate tends to be mixed between unit root and
stationarity ndings (Culver and Papell, 1997; Benati and Kapetanios, 2003).
Perron (1989)-type tests for structural breaks can indicate if an apparent unit
root is break-adjusted stationary. While such an investigation is limited within
the short time periods available for transition countries, the Croatian ination
rate (pt) does not appear to be trending (Figure 1). The visual impression is
further conrmed by the unit-root tests (Table 3), which strongly reject the null
up to the fth lag in the ADF regression (as no lagged di¤erences are signicant,
simple DF test su¢ ces; the t-DF value is 9.653, with (yt 1) = 0.026).
4. Econometric modelling
4.1. The Income Velocity of Money
The observed downward trend in velocity in Figure 3 may be deterministic or
stochastic. A stochastic trend can be tested for using an unrestricted VAR in
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Table 3.2: Denition of variables
Symbol Denition
it Industrial production
mt Money
(m  p)t Real money
pt CPI prices
pt Ination
ext HRK/euro exchange rate
rt Money market interest rate
vt Money velocity (pt + yt  mt)
levels. The resulting VECM system is given in equation (1) and the results are
presented in Table 4.1.4

mt
yt

=

1
2

+
11X
i=1
 

(i)
11 
(i)
12

(i)
21 
(i)
22
!
mt i
yt i

+

11 12
21 22

11 12
21 22
0
mt
yt

+

"1t
"2t

; (4.1)
The Johansen (1995) cointegration tests suggest that there is one cointegrating
vector between money and output. Both -max and -trace statistics are above
their 95% critical values with -max being signicant at the 1% level. The (rst)
cointegrating vector including coe¢ cients of mt; yt and t (a time trend) is esti-
mated as 0 = (1; 6:6; 0:01) with the accompanying adjustment coe¢ cient vector
 = (0:05; 0:02). This implies a long-run relationship pt + 6:6yt  mt. Imposing
the restriction5 0 = (1; 1; ) results in the estimated trend coe¢ cient of  0:05
4The lag-length of the VAR was determined by sequential testing for the validity of the
systems reduction, starting with 12 lags (i.e., one year of data) and reducing one lag at a time.
The reduction from 12 to 11 lags was not rejected, while all further reductions were strongly
rejected by the system reduction F -tests.
5The asterisk implies an unrestricted coe¢ cient.
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Table 3.3: Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests
Variable t-ADF (yt 1) ^ j* t-yt j p-value
amt 1.815 0.937 0.026 9 3.333 0.001
bmt 0.166 1.002 0.026 9 3.029 0.003
apt 1.542 0.883 0.005 5 1.847 0.068
bpt 1.018 0.995 0.005 4 1.847 0.068
ait 2.326 0.589 0.032 9 2.097 0.039
bit 0.644 0.966 0.033 2 4.708 0.000
a(m  p)t 1.794 0.939 0.026 9 3.623 0.001
b(m  p)t 0.113 1.002 0.026 9 3.299 0.002
bpt 6.999 0.038 0.005 1 0.125 0.901
aext 1.033 0.966 0.007 2 2.183 0.032
bext 1.725 0.971 0.007 2 2.333 0.022
art 1.485 0.893 0.195 5 1.975 0.052
brt 0.713 1.023 0.199 5 1.707 0.092
 Highest signicant lag in the ADF regression.
a Trend and constant included; 5% c.v. = 3.461, 1% c.v. = 4.066
b Constant included;: 5% c.v. = 2.895, 1% c.v. = 3.507.
and  = ( 0:03; 0:1), which is, however, strongly rejected by the LR 2(1) of 22.3.
It is clear then that the restriction 0 = (1; 1; 0), being even more restricted,
cannot hold either (which is conrmed by the highly signicant LR 2(2) test of
24.64).
The ndings imply that t  I(1) regardless of the presence of a deterministic
trend in the cointegration space. That is, an apparently systematic decline in the
money velocity is in fact stochastic and no xed per annum percent decline or
deterministic downward trend can be claimed. It follows that long-run stability
of the money demand equation requires consideration of additional variables such
as the interest, ination or exchange rates.
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Table 4.1: Johansen cointegration tests: VAR(11) with y0 = (mt; yt)*
H0 : r = p -max 95% CV -trace 95% CV
p = 0 29.53 19.0 25.79 25.3
p  1 4.60 12.3 4.60 12.3
 Eigenvalues: 1 = 0:280; 2 = 0:050
4.2. The Fisher equation
Denoting the nominal interest rate in period t by rt, the real interest rate by t,
and ination by t, the Fisher equation (Fisher, 1930; see also Dimand, 1999)
can be written as rt = t + t. With the additional assumption that t = ^ + "^t
(i.e. real interest rate is constant), where "^t  i:i:d:, the Fisher equation becomes
rt = ^+t+ "^t, which implies independence of the real interest rate and ination.
The equation is usually estimated in log-levels as ln(rt) = ^0+ ^1 ln(t)+ u^t and a
test of the restriction ^1 = 1 is taken to be the test of the (long-run) validity of the
Fisher equation. The constant ^0 can be interpreted as the long-run equilibrium
real rate of interest. Note that when the variables are in logarithms, ination
measured as ln(t) = ln(pt=pt 1) is equivalent to a simple di¤erence in the log of
the price index, i.e.,  ln(pt). Hence the Fisher equation can be stated as 6
ln(rt) = ^0 + ^1 ln(pt) + u^t; u^t  i:i:d:; ^1 = 1: (4.2)
Initially ignoring the order of integration, the estimated equation is
ln(rt) = 3:65
(0:10)
+20:03
(15:46)
 ln(pt) + u^t;
where standard errors are in parentheses and R2 = 0:017, ^ = 0:783, and DW =
6An alternative version of the Fisher equation, given constant money velocity, is mt = pt,
(see, e.g., Monnet and Weber, 2001). This, however, is not suitable for the cases where velocity
is not constant.
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0:081. It is evident that the null hypothesis H0 : ^1 = 0 cannot be rejected, and
in addition, a low Durbin-Watson statistic implies dynamic misspecication. The
ADF unit root test on u^t produced a t-value of 0:519 where the highest signicant
lag is 4, which clearly cannot reject that u^t  I(1). Note that this can also be
inferred from the fact that ln(rt)  I(1) while  ln(pt)  I(0), therefore it must
be that for all ; [ln(rt)   ln(pt)]  I(1).
Alternatively, estimation of Sargents (1972) extended Fisher equation, with
n = m = 3; yields
ln(rt) = 13:74
(0:45)
  2:17
(1:15)
ln(mt)  2:16
(1:62)
ln(mt 1)  1:08
(1:61)
ln(mt 2) + 3:46
(1:05)
mt 3
+ 6:44
(6:23)
 ln(pt) + 0:74
(6:12)
 ln(pt 1) + 0:70
(6:13)
 ln(pt 2)  2:68
(6:15)
 ln(pt 3) + ut;
with R2 = 0:863,  = 0:305, and DW = 0:570. Here, while the Durbin-Watson
statistic is still indicative of some remaining residual autocorrelation, the t is
improved and the residuals are close to stationary.7 However, ination is not
signicant at any lag. This is also seen in the long run solution
ln(rt) = 13:74
(0:45)
  1:95
(0:08)
ln(mt) + 5:19
(12:95)
 ln(pt) + ~ut;
where Wald 2(2) = 548:32, which is highly signicant. Individually, only the
money variable is signicant; ination is not. Similar results are obtained by
estimating the distributed lag version of the Fisher equation (Sargent, 1973),
which is specied as a special case of the extended" equation, i.e., ln(rt) =
~+
Pm
i=1 ~vi ln(pt i) + "t. Estimation of this equation produces insignicant co-
e¢ cients of ination at all lags (including up to 12 lags) and similarly insignicant
long-run coe¢ cients (not shown). In addition, the residuals are non-stationary
which conrms the previous conclusion about the integration orders.
7The ADF t-value was  2:637 with 7 lags included in the regression, which is above the 1%
critical value of  2:591 for the regression without trend or constant.
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Alternatively, following Crowder and Ho¤man (1996) and Crowder (1997),
we can consider a bivariate VECM system using the Johansen technique. The
specication is
rt
2pt

=

1
2

+
11X
i=1
 

(i)
11 
(i)
12

(i)
21 
(i)
22
!
rt i
2pt i

+

11 12
21 22

11 12
21 22
0
rt 1
2pt 1

+

1t
2t

:
Estimation of this system produces eigenvalues of 1 = 0:109 and 2 = 0:055; the
-max and -trace statistics are 10.31 and 15.38, respectively, which is well bellow
their 95% critical values of 19 and 25.3.8 These results imply that the interest
rate and the ination rate are not cointegrated. The long-run Fisher equation
does not hold.
The above approaches to testing the Fisher equation have the problem of the
integration order of interest rates and ination variables, since the Croatian ina-
tion is I(0):9 To avoid the integration order problems and consistently estimate
^1 from the Fisher equation, ln(rt) = ^0 + ^1 ln(pt) + u^t, consider the OLS
estimator10
~1 =
PT
t=1
2 ln(pt) ln(rt)PT
t=1 [
2 ln(pt)]
2
:
It can be shown that ~1 is asymptotically normally distributed since ln(rt) 
I(1) )  ln(rt)  I(0), while  ln(pt)  I(0) ) 2 ln(pt)  I(0); this estimator
uses only I(0) variables and the standard distribution theory applies.11 Estimation
produces the following results:
 ln(rt) = 3:56
(2:69)
2 ln(pt) + v^t;
8A linear trend was included in the cointegrating space.
9However Sargents (1972) extension, that includes levels of money, will yield valid inference,
given that money is I(1) and cointegrated with interest rates; hence the I(0) ination would
enter merely as an additional stationary regressor.
10We assume the variables are measured as deviations from the means.
11To see that ~1 is a consistent estimator of ^1, observe that
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where R2 = 0:018,  = 0:190, and DW = 2:04. These results allow drawing
correct statistical inference on the estimated coe¢ cients, and also the Durbin-
Watson statistic is indicative of no remaining autocorrelation in the residuals.
However, the standard error of the ~1 coe¢ cient is 2.69, which gives a t-ratio
of 1.33. The null hypothesis H0 : ~1 = 0 cannot be rejected. This result again
implies that the Fisher equation does not hold in Croatia. Thus it may be that the
ination rate enters the long-run money-demand relation as a separate variable
along with the interest rate.
4.3. Money Demand Estimation
Following Baba et al. (1992), the baseline real money demand, or (m   p)t; is
specied so as to include real income yt; the nominal interest rate rt and the
ination rate pt: Within a multivariate cointegration framework, the order of
the estimated VECM needs to be properly specied in terms of the lag-length
selection before commencing with the cointegration analysis. Formal tests of sys-
tems reduction validity, progressively reducing the number of lags in the sys-
tem, reject all reductions beyond VAR(12), making the model a VECM with
zt = [(m  p)t;yt;2pt;rt], and using 12 lags. The four-variable system is
specied as
ln(rt)  ln(rt 1) = ^0 + ^1 ln(pt) + u^t   (^0 + ^1 ln(pt 1) + u^t 1)
)  ln(rt) = ^12 ln(pt) + ut
where 2 ln(pt)   ln(pt)   ln(pt 1) = ln(pt)   2 ln(pt 1) + ln(pt 2), and ut  (u^t   u^t 1).
However, the ^0 coe¢ cient from ln(rt) = ^0+ ^1 ln(pt)+ u^t, i.e., the long-run equilibrium real
rate of interest, cannot be estimated.
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Estimation using the Johansen maximum likelihood technique indicates two sta-
tionary combinations among (real) money, output, the interest rate and ination
rate variables (Table 5).12 In particular, the restricted estimation where the rank
condition (r = 2) and weak exogeneity of ination were jointly imposed produced
an LR 2(2) test of 3.733 (p = 0:155): Thus the joint hypothesis that r = 2 and
that ination is weakly exogenous with respect to the long-run parameters cannot
be rejected.
The 0 and  are estimated as
0 =
0BB@
1:00  2:66 17:00 0:36 0:0079
 0:02 1:00  3:40 0:09  0:0002
0:00  0:01 1:00  0:00  0:0000
18:45  15:30  147:46 1:00  0:1223
1CCA
 =
0BB@
0:09  0:58  4:93  0:0023
0:20  0:99 0:23 0:0025
 0:02 0:02  1:18 0:0005
 2:42  3:34 15:53 0:0027
1CCA :
Imposing the rank restrictions, the estimates of 0 and  are
12See also Cziráky (2002).
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0 =
  0:23 0:59  3:04  0:08  0:0018
 0:02 0:67  2:06 0:06  0:0002

;  =
0BB@
 0:37  0:86
 0:99  1:51
   
10:71  4:97
1CCA
The adjustment coe¢ cients for the money demand relation are large and neg-
ative ( 0:37 and  0:86), which indicates fast adjustment to the long run. Nor-
malizing the rst cointegrating relation to (m  p)t and the second one to yt, and
writing the long-run relationships in equation format, the long-run money demand
and income determination equations are
(m  p)t = 2:57yt   13:22pt   0:35rt   0:01t;
yt = 0:03(m  p)t + 3:07pt   0:09rt + 0:003t:
The latter relation can be interpreted as a small real balance e¤ect on output (see
for example Ireland, 2001, on this e¤ect), or as indicating a Phillips curve relation.
One-step and break-point Chow tests were conducted for the individual equa-
tions and for the entire system. Stability of the system is indicated by the fact
that the recursive break-point Chow tests generally fall below the 95% critical
value. The one-step Chow tests detect an outlier in March 2000.
Table 4.2: Johansen cointegration tests: z = [(m  p)t; yt;pt; rt]*
H0 : r = p -max 95% CV -trace 95% CV
p = 0 66.11 31.5 124.50 63.0
p  1 36.03 25.5 58.40 42.4
p  2 15.48 19.0 22.37 25.3
p  3 6.89 12.3 6.89 12.3
 Eigenvalues: 1 = 0:528; 2 = 0:336; 3 = 0:161; 4 = 0:075.
19
4.3.1. Money Demand without the Ination Rate
As part of the robustness check of the baseline model, the money demand is also
estimated with the assumption that the Fisher equation holds and so the inclusion
of the ination rate is not necessary. The estimation of the system without the
ination rate term requires a three-variable VECM instead of the four-variable one
for the baseline. Experiments here nd three cointegrating vectors with two of
the three eigenvalues signicant on the basis of both -max and -trace statistics
(see Table 6). This suggests that the third vector is apparently non-stationary,
or I(1), while the estimates of the cointegrating vectors and their adjustment
coe¢ cients are similar in both models. The money demand cointegrating vector
is (mt   pt) = 2:25yt   0:44rt   0:01t.
Table 4.3: Johansen cointegration tests VAR(11): z = [(m  p)t; yt; rt]*
H0 : r = p -max 95% CV -trace 95% CV
p = 0 48.90 25.5 79.80 42.4
p  1 26.25 19.0 30.90 25.3
p  2 4.65 12.3 4.65 12.3
 Eigenvalues: 1 = 0:419; 2 = 0:253; 3 = 0:050.
Additional tests are made for the reduced rank r = 2 and (jointly) for the
exclusion of the deterministic trend from the cointegrating space. The exclusion
of the trend is strongly rejected by the LR test statistic: 2(2) = 25:36. A signicant
problem with the reduced rank model emerges from 1-step and breakpoint Chow
tests. These tests are failed, which indicates a lack of parameter stability (or
constancy) that may be causing instability of the entire system.
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4.3.2. Money Demand with Exchange Rates
As another alternative that checks the robustness of the baseline specication,
we consider Petrovic and Mladenovics (2000) model of money demand which
includes exchange rates in lieu of a nominal interest rate or an ination rate. This
approach is based on dollarization" or fear of oating" arguments (Calvo and
Reinhart, 2002), although note that Taylor (2001) is more circumspect about what
role exchange rates might play during a ination-targeting regime. To test the
exchange rate approach, money demand is re-estimated with the exchange rate
(ext) replacing the ination rate; the nominal interest rate is kept in the system.
The VECM system is then z^t = [(m   p)t;yt;ext;rt] and the results of
the cointegration tests are presented in Table 7. They indicate as many as three
cointegrating vectors.
Table 4.4: Johansen cointegration tests: z^ = [(m  p)t; yt; ext; rt]*
H0 : r = p -max 95% CV -trace 95% CV
p = 0 60.62 31.5 149.00 63.0
p  1 49.96 25.5 88.37 42.4
p  2 26.32 19.0 38.41 25.3
p  3 12.09 12.3 12.09 12.3
 Eigenvalues: 1 = 0:498; 2 = 0:430; 3 = 0:256; 4 = 0:127.
The unrestricted estimates of the ^0 and  ^ matrices are similar to the baseline
model. Restricting the cointegrating rank to r = 2 and imposing weak exogeneity
of the exchange rate, gives the following estimates
^
0
=
  0:48 1:69 0:10  0:17  0:005
 0:16 1:62  0:30 0:20  0:004

;  ^ =
0BB@
 0:03  0:02
 0:30  0:72
   
3:10  2:65
1CCA
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The LR test for the imposed restrictions has a 2(2) of 2.226 (p = 0:329), which
does not reject the joint restriction that r = 2 and that the exchange rate is
weakly exogenous for the long-run parameters. A notable di¤erence, however,
is in the near-zero values for the adjustment parameters in the money-demand
equation (0.03 and 0.02). Including the exchange rate in place of the ination
rate causes the model to lose completely the fast short-run adjustment property
of the baseline model. The adjustment would take place almost never, making
the exchange rate model unable to explain a stable money demand in the face of
shocks.
5. Conclusion
The paper presents a rigorous model of money demand for a EU accession coun-
try, Croatia, during its transition years. First it examines whether the classical
Fisher equation of interest rates holds, whereby the nominal interest rate should
move together with the ination rate. Transition/EU-accession countries such as
Croatia are perhaps especially likely to be undergoing changes in ination rate
policy that produce unexpected ination rates; this can lead to a failure of the
nominal interest rate and the ination rate to move together. Finding no evidence
in support of the Fisher interest equation for Croatia, using a battery of tests,
the paper then species the baseline model as a classical money demand function
extended to include the ination rate. With vector error correction methods, a
cointegrated money demand function results with both parameter stability and
timely dynamic re-equilibration to shocks.
For robustness, the baseline model specication is compared to likely alterna-
tive specications. First examined is the baseline without the ination rate, this
being the standard, classic, money demand function. This alternative exhibits
parameter instability. Second, the exchange rate is substituted into the baseline
model in place of the ination rate. This reects a theme of the transition money
demand literature: that the exchange rate acts as the ination rate in the money
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demand function because the ination rate is fully "passed through" to exchange
rate changes. This specication shows long run cointegration, but no timely dy-
namic adjustment to shocks. The lack of short run adjustment makes it an inferior
alternative. The robustness of the baseline model relative to the main alternatives
allows for some condence in the results.
Interpretation requires caution because of the data limitations that character-
ize all transition country studies. Starting the data series for Croatia only in 1994
avoids a hyperination that peeked at around a 1500% annual rate in 1993; after
this a new currency was introduced. Given the data qualication, the results can
be interpreted rst as showing that a stable money demand exists despite a less
than calm period economically and politically.
Second, the analysis suggests that a policy that causes gradual changes in the
ination rate is unlikely to disrupt the baseline money demand function because it
includes the ination rate as a variable. This means that a policy of maintaining
a low ination rate, or even gradually reducing the ination rate if it were at a
higher level as in Hungary, is not likely to induce an apparent instability in the
estimated money demand function. In turn, the ination rate should be able to
be more easily forecasted using variables that enter the money demand function.
Then the forecasts can be used by the central bank to continue to act to stabilize
the ination rate, a type of self-reinforcing interaction of policy with the behavior
of consumers.13
In contrast, a policy for example that targets the exchange rate without regard
to the ination rate could induce unexpected jumps in the ination rate that cause
apparent "shifts" in the money demand function. This can lead to the belief that
money demand is unstable, and justify further discretion from the central bank to
o¤set the apparently unstable money demand function. This circle of interaction
between policy and the consumer is less appealing in that the ultimate policy
13In discussing ination forecasting, Balfoussia and Wickens (2005) note that "Although there
is no necessary reason for a good forecasting model to have theoretical underpinnings, theory
may still be able to help in the choice of the model to use (p.1).
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would likely be less e¢ cacious, and could lead to an "ination bias". This is
not to argue that exchange rate targeting is necessarily worse than ination rate
targeting. It does suggest that the use of exchange rate instruments in Croatia
may de facto be part of a policy of ination rate targeting.
Policy-consumer interaction is an important factor in the ultimate e¢ cacious-
ness of policy, as emphasized by Lucass (1976) "critique". The nature of such
interaction in general is not regime or consumer-behavior dependent, given the
usual assumption of rationality of the agents. The specics of the policy "func-
tion" that incorporates the consumer behavioral reactions will certainly change
with the particular policy employed. Some policies will be less wasteful of societal
resources than others. Arguably, a stable money demand function combined with
ination rate goals results in a rather e¢ cacious interaction. And it is of some
interest to see such a stable money demand function arising in a dynamic economy
like Croatia, that has an explicit price stability goal set out in its central bank
act.
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